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Abstract 
This paper formulates a bioeconomic model to analyze community incentives for wildlife 
management under benefit-sharing programs like the Communal Areas Management Programme for 
Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe. Two agents influence the wildlife stock: a parks 
agency determines hunting quotas, and a local community chooses to either aid or discourage outside 
poachers. Wildlife generates revenues from hunting licenses and tourism; it also intrudes on local 
agriculture. We consider two benefit-sharing regimes: shares of wildlife tourism rents and shares of 
hunting licenses. Resource sharing does not necessarily improve community welfare or incentives for 
wildlife conservation. Results depend on the exact design of the benefit shares, the size of the benefits 
compared with agricultural losses, and the way in which the parks agency sets hunting licenses. 
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1. Introduction 
Many prominent African species of wildlife—including lions, rhinos, and elephants 
—are threatened with extinction because of habitat loss, poaching, and competition with 
other land uses. Recent conservation efforts have begun to focus not only on regulation and 
enforcement of restrictions on trade and use of wildlife, such as the bans on ivory, but also on 
mitigating some of the economic consequences of human–wildlife conflicts. In particular, 
major international and nongovernmental conservation organizations are supporting 
initiatives to promote and share the economic benefits of wildlife conservation with local 
communities.1 At first glance, benefit sharing seems unquestionably likely to encourage 
wildlife conservation and to improve incomes among poor rural communities by making 
wildlife a valuable resource. However, before we can draw this conclusion, more attention 
must be paid to the institutional and dynamic complexities of wildlife management problems. 
An important policy question is how the actual design of benefit-sharing initiatives might 
affect their success, in terms of both wildlife and community welfare. 
Zimbabwe offers an interesting case study of these issues. The establishment of 
national parks, game reserves, and safari areas in the late 1920s may have helped avert 
biodiversity and wildlife loss, but it also displaced rural communities from land that was 
traditionally theirs. Cultivation and grazing land was expropriated, and the old practice of 
subsistence hunting became illegal. Although wildlife gained a permanent residence in the 
parkland, it could also roam freely in surrounding areas, destroying crops and threatening 
                                                 
* Carolyn Fischer is a fellow at Resources for the Future (RFF), 1616 P Street, NW, Washington, DC 20036 
(fischer@rff.org). Edwin Muchapondwa is with the Department of Economics, University of Zimbabwe, P.O. 
Box MP167, Harare, Zimbabwe (emuchapondwa@yahoo.com). Thomas Sterner is a professor of economics at 
Göteborg University, Sweden, as well as an RFF university fellow (Thomas.Sterner@economics.gu.se). 
Financial support from the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) is gratefully 
acknowledged. Thanks to Anders Skonhoft for valuable discussions and also for comments from many 
colleagues, including Hala Abou-Ali, Wisdom Akpalu, Razack Bakari-Lokina, Gardner Brown, Fredrik 
Carlsson, Partha Dasgupta, Jorge Garcia, Karl-Göran Mäler, Ola Olsson, Anders Skonhoft, Som Somanathan, 
Brian Walker, and Mahmud Yesuf. 
1 See, for instance, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) program on bushmeat (http://www.cites.org/eng/prog/bushmeat.shtml). 
1 Resources for the Future  Fischer, Muchapondwa, and Sterner 
livestock and people. Thus the creation of parklands created a conflict between wildlife 
conservation and agricultural development, since the growth of the wildlife depends on the 
size of the parkland (Cumming 1989; Swallow 1990; Emerton 2001). 
The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management owned the wildlife in 
trust for Zimbabwe and collected the economic benefits produced by wildlife from sale of 
licenses for consumptive wildlife use (hunting) and from nonconsumptive wildlife services 
(benign tourism). Hunting is ordinarily disallowed in national parks, but the country has 17 
safari areas in which limited hunting occurs, as well as benign tourism.2 The local people 
near wildlife areas subsisted primarily by engaging in livestock production and marginal crop 
agriculture, suffering wildlife intrusions. Despite wildlife protections, illegal poaching grew 
problematic, and locals would often turn a blind eye or even collaborate, since wildlife posed 
a nuisance. 
In 1989, Zimbabwe instituted a benefit-sharing program for wildlife, the Communal 
Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). It focuses 
especially on communal areas adjacent to national parks, where wildlife intrusion is most 
problematic and agricultural productivity is marginal.3 CAMPFIRE gives communities co-
ownership of local natural resources, which generate income through leasing trophy hunting 
concessions, harvesting natural resources, tourism, live animal sales, and meat cropping. The 
program went through a period of intense development during the 1990s and has inevitably 
suffered from the recent crisis in the country; however, in that first decade, there were some 
important signs of success—but also some considerable difficulties. 
In this paper, we analyze welfare implications of resource profit sharing in a typical 
wildlife-abundant rural area in Zimbabwe in which wildlife conservation can conflict with 
agricultural production. Although heavily inspired by CAMPFIRE, our analysis is distilled to 
represent revenue-sharing programs for wildlife somewhat more broadly. We employ a 
bioeconomic model similar to those formulated for the East African case in Shulz and 
Skonhoft (1996), Skonhoft and Solstad (1996, 1998), and Skonhoft (1998), among others.4 
However, the model in this paper extends that work in two ways. First, unlike previous 
                                                 
2 Safari areas cover a total of 1,892,724 hectares; examples include Chewore, Chirisa, Matetsi, and Sapi. 
3 In Zimbabwe, more than 90% of the communal lands are located within agriculturally marginal regions 
plagued by persistent drought, low, erratic rainfall, and poor soil. Crop production in these regions is very low 
since they are ecologically best suited to extensive cattle and wildlife ranching. The hunger for land is one of 
the factors that have led to occupation of commercial farms in the more productive regions. It also creates 
considerable tension over wildlife in the national parks that border on the less productive farm areas.  
4 See also Baland and Platteau (1996) for a general overview of the role of communities in wildlife management 
and Gadgil and Rao (1994, 1995) for work on biodiversity conservation in India. 
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papers that study poaching by the local communities, it studies poaching conducted by 
outsiders (from the local community’s perspective). Second, unlike previous papers that give 
prominence to antipoaching enforcement by the parks agency, it emphasizes the antipoaching 
effort that local communities are exerting. 
This approach is inspired by the situation in Zimbabwe in the late 1990s, when the 
CAMPFIRE project was beginning to settle into a more mature phase. At that time in 
Zimbabwe, poaching was largely believed to be conducted by foreign nationals. 
Consequently, we assume that local communities do not benefit directly from poaching 
proceeds; rather, they choose to what degree to collaborate with or oppose poachers, based 
on their perception of the value of wildlife. Under CAMPFIRE, a significant amount of the 
antipoaching enforcement was applied by local communities through the hiring of 
community-based antipoaching units. 
This characterization of community effort contrasts with previous studies in which 
local populations engage in open-access hunting and reap those use benefits directly. Bulte 
(2003) focuses on differences between poaching and conservation of different species. Bulte 
and Horan (2003) develop a model of open-access wildlife exploitation, habitat conservation, 
and agriculture, in which farmers may either hunt for wildlife or grow crops. They show that 
increasing wildlife conservation may well be Pareto-superior to equilibria in which 
agriculture dominates. Kinyua et al. (2000) also deal with wildlife management but focus 
more on the competition between wildlife and grazing and, in particular, on the incentives for 
large commercial ranchers. 
Also relevant to our model is the growing literature on the optimal management of 
multiuse species, in which wildlife are both resources and pests, such as Zivin et al. (2000) 
and Rondeau (2001). Most recently, Horan and Bulte (2004) consider optimal management 
in the presence of second-best trade restrictions. As in these models, the shadow value of 
wildlife to the community may be negative or positive, which can create certain 
complications. However, we depart from the social planner problem to study the interaction 
among several agents, taking a particular look at the dynamics of the game for the park 
managers, the communities, and the poachers. An important distinction is that whereas 
traditional management problems choose harvesting directly, communities can influence the 
net off-take (hunting plus poaching) only indirectly, through their antipoaching effort. 
Skonhoft (1998) considered the impact of different property-sharing regimes on the 
incentives of the park manager and on the welfare of the communities. However, he modeled 
a single interaction between wildlife and the community, in the form of intrusions; the park 
manager’s incentives derived from the relative marginal values of tourism and hunting 
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licenses, while the communities received only the effects of the revenue shares and the 
wildlife interactions. Neither agent engaged in strategic behavior with respect to the  
other’s reaction. 
We focus on the incentives for the communities as well as the park manager. In our 
model, the community has the added option to affect the wildlife stock—and thereby the 
intrusions and their shares of the revenue streams—through antipoaching effort. This creates 
a strategic game with the park manager, who also wants to affect wildlife stocks. Johannesen 
and Skonhoft (forthcoming) present a Nash game in which both the communities and the 
park manager choose harvesting effort, as opposed to off-take, in a form of duopoly 
competition. Although they pose similar questions about resource sharing, their setup 
contrasts with our characterization of the CAMPFIRE case, in which the parks agency sets 
the number of hunting licenses (as opposed to hunting effort), while the community 
influences poaching by outsiders. These subtle differences change the nature of the strategic 
interactions. Since strategic responses are so important for the efficacy of benefit-sharing 
programs, we take an agnostic view of park manager objectives and explore several plausible 
reactions to changes in the wildlife stock. 
We find that resource sharing with local communities can have ambiguous effects on 
both conservation incentives and welfare. We demonstrate that conservation incentives 
depend critically on three factors: the type of resource activity that generates the shared 
profits, the extent to which these shared profits outweigh agricultural losses from additional 
wildlife, and the way that the parks agency responds to profit sharing and whether the 
community internalizes this response. 
Because of the prominence this paper assigns to poaching, we briefly discuss 
poaching, antipoaching activities, and community-based wildlife conservation in Zimbabwe 
in Section 2 before we set up the model in Section 3. Thereafter, we analyze how the 
allocation of the property rights from the two sources of wildlife profits affects conservation 
incentives and welfare (Section 4). The paper concludes in Section 5. 
2. Poaching in Zimbabwe and Project CAMPFIRE 
It has been argued that poaching may be the economically most important form of 
wildlife utilization throughout much of Africa (Milner-Gulland and Leader-Williams 1992a, 
1992b). Poaching can be subsistence or commercial. In Zimbabwe, the local communities 
themselves engage in small-scale subsistence poaching mainly for smaller game, such as 
spring-hare, bushbuck, and guinea fowl, which generally have large stocks and high growth 
rates. This type of illegal harvest has tended to be overlooked by the parks agency to the 
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extent that it remains poaching for the pot. It is difficult for the parks agency to enforce 
antipoaching laws against local communities who live close to the wildlife resource and 
stubbornly claim traditional ownership of it, at least for consumption purposes. Tradition and 
culture have tended to be the main regulators of this kind of poaching. 
Commercial poaching mainly targets larger game for trophy sales and is usually 
carried out by professional poachers with automatic weapons, typically outsiders employed 
by dealers. The ultimate customers are international and have considerable financial 
resources. In Zimbabwe, the public perception, which is reinforced by the media and the 
parks agency, is that commercial poachers are Zambians and occasionally Mozambicans 
(Duffy 2000). To succeed, poachers usually make use of a few local informers and 
accomplices whom they remunerate for their assistance; however, little income from 
commercial poaching actually reaches the local communities. 
Poaching is thought to occur mainly outside the protected areas, where the vastness of 
habitats and financial constraints make the parks agency an absentee owner. Some 
antipoaching activities have been carried out on the parkland by the parks agency, police, and 
defense forces. Even within the parks, these officials have great difficulty enforcing 
antipoaching measures, given that they do not permanently live close to the safari area. 
Outside the protected areas, the parks agency has largely withdrawn its limited services in 
antipoaching enforcement. 
The CAMPFIRE program was created to institute sustainable management practices 
for wildlife, land, and other natural resources by rural communities. The 1982 Parks and 
Wildlife Act provided the legal structure for the devolution of authority over wildlife 
resources to the democratically elected rural district councils. Structured into an independent, 
quasigovernmental framework, CAMPFIRE covers all natural resources, though its focus has 
been on wildlife management in areas adjacent to the national parks. 
At the national level, CAMPFIRE is run by a collaborative group that coordinates 
policy, training, institution building, research, monitoring, and international advocacy. 
Membership of the collaborative group is drawn from the CAMPFIRE Association, the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management, the Ministry of Local Government, 
and other organizations, such as WWF and the Africa Resources Trust. CAMPFIRE has 
relied heavily on donor funds to pay for administrative expenses, with only a small fraction 
being covered by its activities. From 1989 to 1999, the program received at least US$33 
million from international donors (Patel 1998). The day-to-day activities are carried out by 
the communities themselves through village, ward, and district committees. 
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The parks agency remains the guardian of all wildlife in Zimbabwe under 
CAMPFIRE and sets the quotas for hunting licenses that will be sold by the rural 
communities and itself, each in a designated area of control. Of late, the rural communities 
have been more involved in the quota-setting process. The proceeds from hunting  
(licenses) and tourism fees go to the rural communities, which utilize the revenues and 
engage in wildlife conservation to benefit themselves as communities rather than individuals 
(Patel 1998). 
The motivation for CAMPFIRE was to integrate the local communities into decisions 
about wildlife conservation and give them shares of the benefits. Absent such benefits, the 
local communities have an interest in getting rid of the nuisance from wildlife, particularly 
large game, and they are likely to tolerate poaching. With integration, the local communities 
begin to perceive game as a resource and the activities that harm it as poaching. This change 
in local norms and peer enforcement alienates accomplices and makes poaching more 
difficult and expensive because the poachers cannot count on local support. It eventually 
becomes natural for neighbors to monitor, report, or discourage poaching and related 
behavior—activities that we refer to as antipoaching effort. Some communities have 
employed and trained game guards to monitor the state of the resource, carry out problem 
animal control, implement antipoaching campaigns, and monitor the interaction between 
local communities, safari operators, safari clients, and the resource.5 
Evidence from some areas in Zimbabwe shows that poaching was rampant prior to 
CAMPFIRE. Since then, poaching has been drastically reduced in some areas as the 
neighboring communities started reaping economic benefits from legal wildlife utilization 
and consequently began to make public arrests of commercial poachers (Child et al. 1997). 
However, in other areas, poaching subsided only temporarily with CAMPFIRE and then 
bounced back after a few years. 
3. Model 
The bioeconomic model comprises two agents (the parks agency and a local 
community), two control variables (hunting quotas and antipoaching effort), and a stock 
variable representing wildlife. Economic rents are generated from wildlife (viewing and 
hunting), which may be distributed between the parks agency and the local community, and 
from agricultural production, which solely benefits the community. 
                                                 
5 Examples include Muzarabani, Guruve, Chipinge, Gokwe North, UMP Zvataida, Binga, Hwange, and 
Nyaminyami. 
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Each agent has a fixed amount of land. Parkland is the permanent residence of 
wildlife, and the local community has user rights over the remaining land. Land use within 
the park is restricted to wildlife conservation; the main agricultural alternatives outside the 
park are livestock and crop production. Wildlife tends to roam around the lands adjacent to 
the park. Intruding wildlife damages crops, competes for the scarce grazing land with 
livestock, transmits diseases,6 and otherwise reduces agricultural productivity. It also presents 
a threat to property and to the population itself, although such threats are not the main focus 
of this paper. 
The ecological interaction between wildlife and agricultural productivity is assumed 
in this paper to be unidirectional—a negative effect from wildlife to agriculture, but not vice 
versa. For example, wildlife roams into the rangeland, but in Zimbabwe, the local community 
is not allowed to take its livestock into the parks. Thus the extent of wildlife conflict can be 
depicted simply as a function of agricultural rents that decline with the stock of wildlife, 
which tends to increase the likelihood of intrusions. 
The rents from wildlife conservation arise in the form of revenue from hunting 
licenses and from benign tourism. As in Skonhoft (1998), we model two kinds of profit 
sharing. Before CAMPFIRE, all of the hunting license rents—and most of the tourism 
profits—rested with the parks agency, although this agent may effectively also represent 
safari lodges and other actors. Under CAMPFIRE, the issuing of a hunting quota to the local 
community implies giving the local community a share of the hunting profits (α), either by 
sharing the revenues or by allowing them to sell their quotas directly. The local community 
may also get a share of the profits from benign tourism (β). We assume that the local 
community’s profit shares α and β are fixed through time and satisfy 01 α ≤≤  and 
01 β ≤≤ . The remaining profit is assumed to go to the parks agency. An important question 
addressed in this paper is how the relative allocation of the benefits from wildlife activities 
affects the conservation and antipoaching incentives. 
Wildlife 
Assuming that wildlife can be represented as a single species, its biomass at a 
specified point in time (where the time index is omitted) is given by W. The growth in the 
stock is given by Equation (1), where  is the natural growth function of the stock of 
wildlife, h is the off-take from hunting, and q represents the loss due to poaching: 
( ) FW
                                                 
6 For example, buffalo can infect livestock with foot and mouth disease or brucellosis. 
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   (1)  () WF Wh q =− − &
Additional implicit constraints are  . One of the potential 
specifications of the natural growth process is the logistic function 
0 () 0 , ( 0 ) , ( ) Wt W W W ≥= ∞ < ∞







⎟  (2) 
where g is the intrinsic growth rate and K is the carrying capacity. 
Poachers 
Implicitly, poachers base their behavior on the effort needed to poach wildlife and 
evade enforcement in relation to the return to poaching. However, with poachers as third 
parties, it suffices to represent the result of their maximized objective function as 
, distilling poaching as a function of the wildlife stock and antipoaching effort 
. The main properties of this function are as follows. No poaching takes place with a zero 
stock of wildlife,  ; more wildlife means a higher illegal off-take,  ; 
more antipoaching effort increases the possibility of detection hence results in lower illegal 
off-take, whereas more collaboration increases the off-take, implying in both cases 
. The second-order derivatives are such that     
 and  . It is important to note that poaching will not necessarily 
be zero however large   becomes, since a certain amount of poaching cannot be detected 
even with the cooperation of the local community. Also, poaching will have a maximum 
bound because of the standard decreasing returns to effort and opportunity costs in the 
implicit poacher objective function. 
(,) qQ W A =
A
(0, ) 0 QA = ( , ) 0 W QW A >
(,)0 A QWA< ( , ) 0, WW QW A < (,)0 , AA QW A >
(,)0 , WA QW A < ( , ) 0 AW QW A <
A
Parks Agency 
The commercial wildlife sector is represented by the parks agency, which determines 
the hunting quota, h. The parks agency generates revenue from wildlife by selling licenses to 
hunters and collecting fees from tourists who engage in nonconsumptive tourism. Although 
the beneficiaries of these revenues are generally more diverse, including safari lodges and 
operators, we will allow these gains to be considered by the parks agency in setting the 
optimal quota. 
We assume that the market price of hunting licenses per unit of harvest has been fixed 
at p. The fact that Zimbabwe is only one of the many countries offering sport-hunting 
opportunities motivates the price-taking assumption. We further assume that the “quality” of 
a license does not depend on the stock of wildlife (i.e., licenses can always be sold at the 
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market price, whether wildlife is so plentiful as to make tracking unnecessary or so scarce 
that a trophy may not be found). 
Costs and demand conditions also are assumed to be constant through time. Revenue 
from nonconsumptive tourism,  , will increase with the stock of wildlife; that is, 
,  , and 
( ) TW
(0) 0 T = ( ) 0 TW ′ > ( ) 0 TW ′′ < . We abstract from the fact that nonconsumptive tourism 
depends on biodiversity, since we represent all wildlife by one stock. 
An important question will be how to characterize the objective function of the parks 
agency. For now, since we want to focus on the community incentives, we will begin by 
representing the harvesting quota decision as a general function  ( , ) hH W A = . We assume 
that harvesting is positive and weakly increasing in these variables 
[ ] and weakly concave in both. An additional 
logical restriction is that any decrease in poaching will not be more than offset by an increase 
in quotas; that is,  . 
(,)0 , (,)0 , (,)0 WA HWA H WA H WA ≥≥≥
( , ) ( , ) AA HW A QW A ≤−
By studying various strategies for the parks agency (like profit maximization or 
simple harvesting rules), we will later be able to address different strategic responses on the 
part of the community. Part of this ambivalence is motivated by real ambiguity regarding the 
motivations of the park managers, which might well involve other preservation goals, as well 
as managing the public good aspects of wildlife that range across the jurisdictions of several 
communities. Furthermore, as noted, hunting and tourism revenues are captured by more 
agents than the local park, including national agencies and safari lodges. Another motivation 
for entertaining different decision rules is to understand the important influence they have on 
the community decisionmaking. 
Local Community 
The community engages in agriculture, which provides rents R(W) that tend to be 
affected negatively by larger wildlife stocks. This function could represent the profit-
maximizing production frontier of livestock rearing or of crops on the community’s fixed 
factor, land. The key property is that it is declining and convex in the stock of wildlife.  
This function can represent the productivity of grazing land, which declines with wildlife 
ranging, or of agricultural land, from which the crops can be eaten or trampled by intruding 
wildlife. Since in Zimbabwe more than 90% of the communal lands is in semiarid regions, 
which are ecologically better suited to wildlife (or cattle), crop production is likely to be at 
subsistence levels. 
Our model emphasizes the antipoaching effort of the local communities rather than 
the parks agency. We assume the parks agency does not carry out any antipoaching activity 
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(or at least does not change its enforcement behavior), which seems appropriate for areas 
adjacent to parklands. The community has a range of antipoaching activities at its disposal: 
encouraging members to withdraw their services to the commercial poachers as informers 
and accomplices, active antipoaching enforcement by monitoring and protecting wildlife, 
reporting inappropriate behavior with respect to wildlife conservation, and employing and 
equipping antipoaching units through district administrative structures. They also have 
options for assisting poachers. 
Engaging in antipoaching effort,  , entails costs—the value of time lost, wages for 
private enforcement agents, and so forth—represented by the function  . This function is 
assumed to be U-shaped: positive, increasing, and convex with positive effort and positive, 
decreasing, and convex for negative effort. Allowing 
A
( ) cA
0 A<  implies that communities may be 
willing to assist poachers to reduce wildlife intrusions;   means efforts against poaching. 
Both kinds of efforts are assumed to be costly. Mathematically, these assumptions imply 
   
0 A >
(0) 0, (0) 0; cc ′ == () 0 , 0 ; cA A >≠ () 0 , () 0 , 0 ; cA cA A ′ ′′ >> >
<
 and 
.7  () 0 , () 0 , 0 cA cA A ′′ ′ <>
The community perceives that the allocation of hunting licenses may be influenced by 
the wildlife stock and by poaching, which it, in turn, influences through its antipoaching 
efforts. With profit sharing, the local community’s utility   combines the rents from 
agriculture with profit shares from hunting and benign tourism, less the costs of antipoaching 
activities:8 
( , ) uW A
 (,) () (,) () ( ) uW A RW p HW A TW cA α β =+ + −  (3) 
The local community maximizes the present value of its income by choosing A 
subject to the dynamics of the wildlife stock. The current value Hamiltonian is 
   (4)  ( (,) () (,) (,) uW A FW HW A QW A γ =+ − − H )
The first-order condition with respect to antipoaching effort is 
  ( ) () ( ,) ( ,) ( ,) AA A cA p H WA QWA H WA αγ ′ =− +  (5) 
                                                 
7 By allowing for collaboration, we also ensure an interior solution. Furthermore, the absence of fixed costs or 
economies of scale should avoid a pulsing equilibrium, as in Rondeau and Conrad (2003). 
8 Although some individuals in the local community may also get economic benefits from the poaching activity, 
such income does not enter the local community’s welfare function, which the community council uses for 
decisionmaking. 
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Positive effort will be exerted if the net gains are positive. Net gains include both the 
shadow value of the net increase in the wildlife stock and the value to the community of any 
additional licenses. Negative effort (collaboration) is implied by a sufficiently negative 
shadow cost. 
The dynamics of the shadow value of the wildlife stock to the community are defined 
by 
  ( ) WW W W W W R pH T F H Q γα β γ δ =− − − + − + + &  (6) 
Community Requirements for a Steady State 
In a steady state,  , and off-take from hunting and poaching must equal growth:  0 W = &
   (7)  (,) (,) () HWA QWA FW +=
Additionally, 0 γ = & and the shadow value of wildlife equals 
 




R WT Wp H W A








Note that this shadow value can be positive or negative, depending on the sign of the 
marginal net benefits to the community (let  WW W MNB R pH T α β = ++ ) and on the excess of 
the discount rate over the marginal net growth (natural replenishment rate net of marginal 
harvesting and poaching, or  WW W MNG F H Q = −− ). As Horan and Bulte (2004) discuss, the 
ambiguity in the sign of the shadow value leads to the possibility of multiple equilibria. They 
call wildlife an “asset” when the marginal net benefits to the community are positive and a 
“liability” when they are negative. Meanwhile, if the shadow value (which incorporates the 
stock dynamics as well as the marginal benefits) is positive, wildlife is a “commodity,” 
whereas a negative shadow value denotes wildlife as a “nuisance.” Using their terminology, 
these combinations form four potential classes of steady states: 
I. Commodity/asset  ( 0, MNB MNG δ >> and thus γ > 0) 
II. Commodity/liability  ( 0, MNB MNG δ < < and thus γ > 0) 
III. Nuisance/asset  ( 0, MNB MNG δ ><and thus γ < 0) 
IV. Nuisance/liability  ( 0, MNB MNG δ < > and thus γ < 0) 
Our model is somewhat more complicated, since the community does not directly 
choose harvesting as a control variable but rather influences the off-take (hunting plus 
poaching) through its choice of antipoaching effort. Correspondingly, harvesting is 
influenced not directly by the community’s shadow value of wildlife but indirectly by its 
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choice of effort. The phase diagram for this problem can be drawn in two parts. First, we map 
the off-take and growth functions against the wildlife stock to see the equilibrium—
conditional on a given level of antipoaching effort. That effort, A, shifts those functions, 
thereby affecting the equilibrium stock, W
*, that satisfies  0 W = & , as shown in Figure 1. 












Next, we map the equilibrium wildlife stock against the level of antipoaching effort. 
In Figure 2, the revenue shares affect the  0 γ = &  isocline, as seen in Equation (6). It depicts a 
possible form for these functions. This hypothetical scenario portrays benefit sharing as 
encouraging more effort, but this result is not guaranteed, as we discuss next. 
In our model, the community will engage in active antipoaching effort if wildlife has 
commodity status, and they will collaborate if it is a nuisance. It is normal to think of Classes 
I and IV, in which the marginal benefits and shadow values of wildlife express the same sign. 
This situation requires  MNG δ > , which tends to imply a larger stock. Although these 
scenarios are more intuitive, Classes II and III are theoretically possible. Since the MNG is 
likely to be diminishing in the wildlife stock, at low initial stock levels, the MNG may exceed 
the discount rate. In this kind of equilibrium, the marginal effects of revenue sharing would 
be reversed. In Class III, the community benefits on the margin from wildlife stock but 
prefers to limit the stock because people know growth is fast and fear that this can become a 
liability at higher stock levels. Thus they may encourage the poachers and will not engage in 
enforcement. In Class II, the community suffers net damages on the margin but wants to 
increase the stock since people know it grows fast (which implies a potential source of 
revenue through the revenue sharing), and thus they will engage in enforcement. 
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dN /dt = 0 (H = 0, I= 1)
dN /dt = 0 (H = 1, I= 0)
dN /dt = 0 (H = 0, I= 0)
 
The possibility of multiple equilibria itself means that resource-sharing schemes can 
have ambiguous effects, depending in part on the initial stock of wildlife, as well as the 
parameter values and forms of the key functions. Stability of the equilibria is another 
important issue, which Bulte and Horan (2003) discuss and show to be dependent in part on 
functional forms. For our purposes, we will acknowledge and abstract from questions of the 
dynamics. We will show that  MNG δ >  is necessary for the existence of an equilibrium with 
a profit-maximizing parks agency in Equation (14), so we will primarily deal with Classes I 
and IV rather than II and III. These cases are more favorable to resource-sharing programs, 
and we will focus on how a steady state, assuming it is locally stable, might respond to a 
change in the resource-sharing regime. 
4. Property Rights and Conservation Incentives 
Next we consider how the allocation of the property rights from the two sources of 
wildlife profits—hunting and tourism—affects conservation incentives. An important factor 
involves the strategic interaction between the communities and the parks agency: does the 
community take into account the reoptimization of hunting allowances, and how does the 
parks agency react? 
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Revenue Sharing: Hunting Licenses versus Tourism Profits 
No Sharing 
In a resource use regime in which the local community does not reap any benefits 
from wildlife (i.e.,  0 α β == ), the shadow value of wildlife to the local community is 
negative, since the wildlife stock merely decreases agricultural rents. Consequently, residents 
will not engage in any antipoaching effort; if anything, they will tolerate poachers and 
possibly assist them to some degree, even without remuneration. This complicity results from 
the fact that their preferred stock of wildlife is effectively zero, since they bear only costs and 
no benefits.9 
Profit Sharing 
According to Equations (5) and (8), the community will want to assist conservation 
by engaging in active antipoaching efforts only to the extent that people gain additional 
license revenues and benefit from additional wildlife stock. This requires that the additional 
revenues from wildlife activities outweigh the costs of additional intrusions: 
() () W pHT WR W α β ′′ +> − . 
Raising tourism shares always improves incentives for conservation and antipoaching 
effort—or at least it reduces incentives to collaborate with poachers. From Equation (8), we 
see that the equilibrium shadow value of wildlife to the community is unambiguously 
increasing in β , and from Equation (5) we see that effort is strictly increasing in the shadow 
value of wildlife. Consequently,  / 0 dA dβ > , and sharing tourism revenues necessarily 
increases antipoaching effort and the equilibrium wildlife stock. 
However, the model reveals that raising hunting quota shares α  increases incentives 
only to the extent the community thinks that its efforts will result in an increase in quotas—
that is, that  . It may seem a reasonable hypothesis that less poaching will give more 
hunting quotas, but this number depends both on the growth rates and on the way the agency 
reacts, which we explore next. If the communities have little faith in the willingness of the 
parks agency to raise quotas, their incentives will be considerably weakened. In the extreme 
case in which the community believes the quota allocation to be fixed, increased hunting 
0 W H >
                                                 
9 We have assumed that the communities have no existence value for wildlife. In fact, Muchapondwa (2003) 
does find such values, but their inclusion here would not add anything very substantial to the model. We would 
still assume these existence values are small compared with agricultural damage, and thus the communities 
would presumably have a small rather than a zero preferred stock. 
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shares act merely as a lump-sum increase in income and welfare of the communities, with no 
impact on conservation incentives. 
We can also get a sense of the dynamics of instituting profit sharing. From Equation 
(8), we see that going from a steady state with no profit sharing to positive shares of wildlife 
revenues causes the shadow value to jump up, since the stock is then lower than is preferred. 
At that point, according to Equation (6), it will decline toward the new steady state.10 
Parks Agency’s Response 
The parks agency’s decision process is important for two reasons. First, the allocation 
of hunting licenses has direct effects on the communities and determines how they respond. 
Second, it influences the wildlife stock in ways outside the control of the community, which 
can affect people’s welfare. 
In reality, the parks agency is a government department, which is to some extent 
commercialized: it retains revenues from its operations and gets additional grants from the 
central government. It has offices that run various national parks and safari areas. As the 
manager of Zimbabwe’s wildlife trust, the agency determines the hunting quota for both the 
safari areas under its direct control and also for the rangelands. The manager of a safari area 
may want to maximize the present value of profits. However, as the same agency also 
manages the national parks and safeguards all wildlife in Zimbabwe, it will also take general 
tourism and biodiversity effects into account, and the off-take from individual safari areas is 
unlikely to be determined independently of dynamics in the national parks. In practice, the 
parks agency seems to determine the harvest rate to maintain a certain range of population, 
which managers term “sustainable off-take.” 
Indeed, communities typically do consider hunting quotas in CAMPFIRE areas to be 
conservative. This may be because the parks agency does not take into account the number of 
animals that the communities want in their areas, and hunting quotas are primarily designed 
for the trophy-hunting industry and as such are generally lower than quotas for nonselective 
hunting. However, one of the advantages of the CAMPFIRE program is that creates dialogue 
among stakeholders, leading to an increasing convergence between the quotas that the 
Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management sets and what the rural district 
councils desire. 
                                                 
10 Starting from the steady state without profit sharing,  0
WW FH Q δ ′ − ++= , so  .  0
W Rp H T γα β ′′ =− − − < &
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Given this ambiguity over the influence of economic incentives on park manager 
decisionmaking, we explore two types of decision rules for determining the hunting quotas, 
representing the extremes of this range of objectives. First, we assume the parks agency 
follows a simple decision rule based on the biology of the wildlife stock, ignoring revenue 
effects. Second, we explore the effects of a parks agency that adjusts to market incentives, 
intending to maximize its own profits. We see that the parks agency’s response to profit 
sharing has important implications for community incentives and welfare. 
Biologically Based Decision Rule 
One could easily conceive of a biologically (rather than economically) determined 
decision rule, in which the parks agency determines a sustainable harvest depending on the 
current stock. For example, suppose the parks agency allows a share of the stock above a 
threshold to be hunted, so (,) ( ) HWA W W ϕ ≡ − .11 In this case, quota allocation is not directly 
affected by antipoaching effort, since  ( , ) 0 A HW A = . 
With this kind of simple decision rule, the community’s equilibrium antipoaching 












Assuming  W F W Q δ ϕ >− −, agricultural losses decrease antipoaching effort, while benefits 
from tourism increase it. In this case, we also find that an increase in the share of hunting 
revenues, α, unambiguously increases antipoaching effort. The adjustment in hunting 
allocations, ϕ , also represents a potential instrument but has a more ambiguous effect. 
When communities would otherwise prefer to collaborate rather than discourage 
poachers (when  ), the quota adjustment  0 MNB < ϕ serves unambiguously to improve 
conservation incentives (or reduce collaboration with poachers), since additional hunting 
licenses both raise revenues for the community and reduce the stock of nuisance wildlife. 
However, when some antipoaching effort is already worthwhile, the effect of 
additional hunting quotas can raise or lower that effort.12 On the one hand, the community 
receives additional revenue shares; on the other hand, quotas reduce the stock of wildlife that 
now has a net positive value to the community. In other words, ignoring the community 
revenue from licenses (or if  0 α = ), the quota response serves to dampen community efforts. 
                                                 
11 To avoid corners, let us assume this minimum is not in danger of being crossed. 
12  ( )
2 {/ } / ( ) ( ) / ( ) AA W W W W W W cQ p F Q R T F Q ϕα δ β δ ϕ = ∂− ∂ − + − + − + +  
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When the community recognizes that the parks agency will increase harvesting as the 
wildlife stock increases, the community responds by saving its costs of managing the stock 
either through facilitating or discouraging poaching. It saves costs of antipoaching efforts 
when they prefer a larger stock, since part of that stock increase is lost to more harvesting, 
and it saves collaboration costs when it prefers a smaller stock, since some of that effort just 
results in fewer quotas. 
Profit Maximization 
If the parks agency is a profit maximizer, as in Skonhoft (1998), it maximizes with 
respect to h the total revenues from wildlife activities—after profit sharing: 
 (1 ) (1 ) ( ) p hT W π αβ =−+ −  (10) 
subject to the stock dynamics of Equation (1), to which we assign the shadow value µ  for 
the parks agency. We assume that the parks agency does not take into account any strategic 
impact on the part of the community’s antipoaching choice (i.e., it perceives that 
).13 Although we will explore different reactions to profit-sharing regimes on the 
part of the parks agency, we will retain this assumption that community behavior is taken as 
given. 
/ dA dh = 0
p
The first-order conditions from the resulting Hamiltonian are the complementary 
slackness conditions 
 0, (1 ) h α µ ≥− ≤  (11) 
implying that licenses will be allocated if the price received by the agency is at least equal to 
the shadow value of the wildlife stock, and 
   (12)  () () (,) ( 1 )() W FW Q WA TW µµ δ β ′ =− + − − & ′
which states that the rate of change in the shadow value reflects the rate of discount, growth, 
poaching impacts, and the relative benefit from increased tourism. 
In a steady state with hunting and tourism, 
  *












−= − = −
−
 (13) 
                                                 
13 This assumption is necessarily valid in Skonhoft, since no antipoaching activity takes place. 
  17Resources for the Future  Fischer, Muchapondwa, and Sterner 
This interior solution thus requires a certain balance between the rents to the parks agency 
from tourism and from hunting. Essentially, the parks agency allows the wildlife stock to 
adjust such that the marginal discounted rents from additional tourism equals the value to the 
parks agency of selling an additional quota. From Equation (13), we see that the steady-state 
wildlife stock is decreasing in additional poaching, decreasing in the rate of time preference 
(which makes current harvesting more valuable), and increasing in the relative return to 
tourism. In other words, the absolute returns to the alternative wildlife activities do not matter 
(assuming an interior solution); rather, the profit-maximizing parks agency will be more 
concerned with conservation if the marginal return to tourism is higher than the marginal 
return to hunting, after profit sharing. In this manner, as Skonhoft (1998) showed, changing 
the relative hunting and tourism revenue shares can change the manager’s incentive for 
setting quotas. 
Note here that the existence of an interior solution in the parks agency problem 














−++ ≥ −+= ≥
−
 (14) 
This result must hold since the parks agency derives only positive benefits from wildlife use. 













.14 In other words, if tourism values are relatively high and the parks get 
no hunting revenue, the agency might actually want to restock wildlife up to its ideal level, 
although we assume they are constrained from doing so (leaving  0 h = , not an interior 
solution). On the other hand, if the parks agency gets no tourism rents, the steady state 
implies ( ) ( , ) W FW Q WA δ ′ =+ , meaning that the stock is more heavily harvested, down to a 
level at which its growth rate is sufficiently high to match the joint effect of discounting and 
poaching. 
To compare the different resource-management and profit-sharing regimes and 
strategic games, let us focus on the steady-state equilibria suggested by an interior solution. 
In a steady state with hunting, the parks agency allocates hunting quotas equal to the net off-
take  . Note that we assume the parks agency takes the community’s path 
of antipoaching efforts as given. 
( ) ( , ) hF W Q W A =−
                                                 
14 This corner also implies a class I or IV equilibrium, since  1 α ≤ . 
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With Equations (5), (8), and (13), we see that the steady-state shadow value and 
antipoaching effort by the community must satisfy 
 
* (1 ) ( )
(1 ) (1 )
WW AA
AA W W
W p Rp HT cp H








The next question is then whether and how the community takes the parks agency’s decision 
into account. 
Symmetric Game 
In a symmetric game, the community also takes the license path being offered by the 
parks agency as fixed. This game is represented by a Cournot–Nash kind of open-loop 
equilibrium. Correspondingly, the community does not believe it can influence the hunting 
quota decision on the margin, and  0 WA HH = = . Simplifying Equation (15), we see that the 
level of effort would then depend on the marginal net benefits to the community and the 

















If the marginal tourism benefits outweigh the marginal agricultural losses to wildlife, effort is 
positive. The relative preference of the park manager for hunting over tourism rents 
reinforces the incentive for effort, be it for antipoaching enforcement or for propoaching 
collaboration. 
Here, we see that in equilibrium with the parks agency—quite differently from the 
community incentive effects alone—the antipoaching effort does not necessarily increase 
with greater sharing of tourism profits. The marginal incentive for effort only increases with 
the community’s tourism share if the total marginal rents from tourism outweigh the marginal 
damages from additional wildlife: 
  { } / (1 )








= ⎜ ∂−− ⎝⎠ β
⎞
⎟  (17) 
In part, this result derives from the fact that, all else equal, although community effort 
is increasing with respect to tourism revenue, the parks agency conservation incentive is 
decreasing in the share of tourism sent to communities. In the extreme case when the 
community always perceives the wildlife as a net nuisance ( 0 WW RT + ≤ , implying that 
agricultural losses from wildlife outweigh benefits to tourism), the loss of the parks agency’s 
stronger incentives for conservation by the transfer of the tourism revenues to the community 
could have significantly negative impacts on the wildlife stock. 
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Similarly, the change in equilibrium effort is ambiguously related to the community’s 
share of hunting profits, displaying the opposite sign of the marginal net benefits from 
agriculture and tourism. The community takes hunting profits as fixed, but the parks agency 
adjusts to losing hunting shares by emphasizing relatively more conservation and a higher 
wildlife stock in equilibrium. The effect is to dampen the community’s influence on the 
equilibrium off-take and stock. They engage in less antipoaching effort if wildlife is a 
commodity and collaborate less if wildlife on the margin is a nuisance. 
With changes in effort ambiguous, the impact of revenue sharing on the equilibrium 
wildlife stock is also ambiguous in the symmetric game. Since increasing β  reduces the 
parks agency’s incentive to conserve, for more sharing of tourism rents to improve the 
wildlife stock, the community has to engage in sufficiently more effort so as to outweigh the 
reduction in care by the parks. Any more effort requires positive total marginal benefits from 
agriculture and tourism—excluding hunting profits. 
On the other hand, raising α  increases the parks agency’s desire to conserve. It 
unambiguously increases the equilibrium wildlife stock when wildlife remains a nuisance to 
the community. Otherwise, if the community values the marginal tourism rents more than the 
agricultural damages, allocating them a larger hunting share detracts from their incentives to 
conserve, limiting (or possibly eliminating) the gains to the wildlife stock. 
Strategic Game 
In a dynamic Stackelberg game with the community as a leader, the community 
recognizes its influence over the parks agency’s response. If the community knows the 















which may be positive or negative, depending on the relative size of tourism rents. 
Furthermore,  : a reduction in poaching on the margin is offset by an increase in 
hunting licenses. 
A HQ =− A
Substituting these incentives into those of the community, we see that Equation (5) 
simplifies to 
 () A cA p Q α ′ =−  (18) 
In other words, although the community cannot on the margin influence the wildlife stock 
targeted by the park manager, it can influence the portion of the total off-take that is 
harvested through hunting rather than poaching. Consequently, when the community is 
strategic in influencing the hunting quotas, it combats poaching to secure a share of those 
licenses for itself, not to manage the wildlife stock. In this case, to the extent the community 
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receives hunting shares, they have the incentive to stop poaching; tourism, however, has  
no effect. 
This strategic influence could raise or lower effort in equilibrium (relative to the 
open-loop case), depending on whether  ( ) /(1 ) ( )/ (1 ) WW W R T αα β β −> + − T . That is, if 
tourism shares are relatively less important (particularly if  0 WW RT β + < ), strategic interests 
raise conservation incentives. It would seem likely that this is closer to reality in Zimbabwe 
where tourism revenues from CAMPFIRE have been small compared with hunting 
revenues.15 However, if the incentive from tourism shares is sufficiently strong,16 the 
community may engage in less effort in equilibrium as a Stackelberg leader, recognizing that 
on the margin it affects only hunting licenses rather than the wildlife stock. 
Corner Solution 
Finally, if the parks agency gets no (or relatively few) hunting rents, its solution 
collapses to the corner  , regardless of whether the community is strategic. The parks 
agency’s equilibrium conditions become irrelevant, since the community is left alone to 















In this case, the tourism share unambiguously improves community incentives for effort. 
Summary 
In Table 1, we summarize the predicted response of community effort to greater 
revenue shares, according the hunting quota adjustment process on the part of the parks 
agency. Note that for the fixed adjustment process and the corner solution, we assume that 
MNG δ >  still holds; else, those results could be reversed. 
 
 
                                                 
15 Personal communication with the former director of the CAMPFIRE Association, Stephen Kasere, June 
2004. 
16 This could be the case in countries with a large amount of wildlife tourism, such as Kenya. 





Table 1. Community Response to Resource Sharing and Parks Agency Policy 
Parks Agency Process for 
Adjusting Hunting Quotas  / dA dα   / dA dβ  
Fixed Rate  + (if  0 ϕ > )  + 
Profit Maximization     
 Symmetric  Game  ? (+ if  0 WW RT β + < ) ?  (+  if  )  0 WW RT +>
 Stackelberg  Game  +  0 
  Corner Solution   0  + 
 
This summary reveals the importance of the parks agency’s management strategy and 
of its interaction with the community. Indeed, those factors determine whether greater 
resource sharing engenders greater conservation or, perversely, more collaboration. 
Welfare 
In terms of community welfare, the formulation of the harvesting decision has 
important effects. When the decision rule for setting hunting quotas does not change, as with 
the biological rule, allocating more of either revenue source can serve only to enhance 
welfare. In essence, all tools for community influence remain in place; the only difference  
is that the community controls more assets under CAMPFIRE. However, this result does  
not necessarily hold if the parks agency changes its quota rules according to the revenue 
shares it receives. 
When the parks agency is a profit maximizer, as in the alternative example, the 
question is whether the shared revenues from an increase in the wildlife stock outweigh the 
corresponding agricultural losses. To take an extreme case, if the community were given all 
the hunting licenses but none of the tourism revenues, the profit-maximizing parks agency 
would authorize no hunting [from Equation (11)] and reap all the benefits from tourism. 
Meanwhile, the community would receive no revenues yet would lose agricultural rents, as 
well as incurring costs while assisting poachers toward thinning the unwanted stock. In that 
case, the community would be strictly worse off. 
At the other extreme, if the community gets all the tourism profits while the parks 
agency gets the hunting revenues, the community necessarily benefits. We can understand 
this result by first ignoring the community’s incentives to promote tourism. By removing 
tourism from the parks agency’s objective function, the park manager expands hunting, 
which improves agricultural rents and saves antipoaching (or collaboration) costs. Then, on 
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top of those gains, the community gets tourism revenue. To the extent that it adjust its 
antipoaching behavior to reoptimize and encourage more wildlife in this scenario, the 
community benefits further. 
The take-home message from this analysis is that sharing resource profits does not 
automatically confer benefits and conservation incentives on local communities. That 
depends importantly on which resource profits are shared, how much is shared, and how the 
resource management practices outside the communities respond. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper we formulated a bioeconomic model of wildlife management in a typical 
rural area in Zimbabwe, where a local community lives adjacent to a safari area. Two agents 
have influence over the wildlife stock: a parks agency, which determines hunting quotas, and 
a local community, which chooses to either collaborate with or discourage poachers from 
outside the area. Wildlife generates economic benefits both from the sale of hunting licenses 
and from nonconsumptive tourism; however, it also intrudes on the agricultural rents of the 
local community. Since a larger wildlife stock reduces agricultural returns, the community 
will engage in antipoaching efforts only if they reap benefits from wildlife activities. 
The CAMPFIRE program in Zimbabwe directed shares of the profits from hunting 
and benign tourism toward the local community, in part to offer direct compensation for the 
nuisance suffered from wildlife and in part to induce antipoaching effort. In many respects, 
CAMPFIRE seemed successful, at least initially. Poaching, seen as rampant prior to 
CAMPFIRE, fell drastically afterward, with evidence of community help. However, in some 
areas poaching subsided only temporarily, and the situation deteriorated again when 
communities did not receive the promised benefits and rural district councils did not generate 
enough money to operationalize the antipoaching units. This analysis demonstrates that mere 
resource sharing does not automatically confer benefits and conservation incentives on local 
communities. Those incentives depend critically on the type of resource activity that 
generates the shared profits, the extent to which these shared profits outweigh agricultural 
losses, and also how profit sharing and community responses affect the resource management 
practices of the parks agency. 
The model reveals that allocating shares of hunting quotas is not enough; 
communities must believe that the parks agency will afford them more licenses if their 
conservation efforts lead to a larger wildlife stock. If they perceive the hunting quota to be 
fixed, their profit share is treated as a transfer and does not affect their conservation 
incentives. Later in the program, the parks agency began to engage input from the rural 
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communities in the quota setting process, which indicates a possible improvement in the 
incentive effects of the hunting revenue shares. 
Tourism revenue shares may more recognizably offer conservation incentives, which 
may explain some of the success stories of safari lodges that engage local communities. 
However, the overall effect of this incentive depends on the response of the parks agency. If 
less poaching merely translates into more licenses—and the communities know this—the 
incentives to resist poaching then derive primarily from the hunting revenues. If, on the other 
hand, additional licenses do not completely crowd out reductions in poaching, the community 
will expend more effort against poaching (or at least collaborate less) to the extent they 
receive more revenues from tourism. When the communities do not expect the parks agency 
to change its allocation of hunting quotas, their additional efforts to promote tourism through 
more conservation can be tempered after a while—even undone completely—if the parks 
agency does not itself have enough incentive of its own remaining to protect the wildlife 
stock for tourism. 
Finally, community welfare is not necessarily enhanced if the parks agency changes 
its harvesting decisions when shares of its revenues are diverted to communities. Given any 
decision rule for harvesting, profit shares transfer valuable assets to communities, and any 
changes in their behavior further enhance their welfare (even if they do not enhance 
conservation). However, if the parks agency changes the way it determines hunting quotas, 
and that runs counter to the new wildlife stock objectives of the community, the local 
community can be made worse off by profit sharing. This welfare reduction can result since 
the parks agency does not consider the impacts of wildlife on agricultural rents, and although 
the community might share in the profits from hunting, it cannot set the quotas directly. 
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